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This paper investigates the effects of managerial outsourcing on the incentives and performance 
of mutual funds. We document that mutual fund families outsource the management of a 
significant fraction of their funds to unaffiliated advisory firms. Funds managed externally 
significantly under-perform those ran internally. To establish the causality of this relationship, we 
instrument for whether a fund is outsourced and find similar estimates. We hypothesize that 
contractual externalities due to firm boundaries make it more difficult to extract performance 
from an outsourced relationship. We verify two auxiliary predictions of this hypothesis: 
compared to counterparts ran internally, an outsourced fund faces higher-powered incentives in 
that they are more likely to be closed due to poor performance or excessive risk-taking, and an 
outsourced fund takes less risk in response. 
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I. Introduction 
Over the most recent decades, open-end mutual funds have been one of the fastest 
growing institutions in this country. From 1980 to 2007, the percentage of American households 
owning mutual funds rose from 5.7% to 43.6% (Investment Company Institute (2007)).  While 
the flow of new money has leveled off in the recent years,1 the mutual fund industry remains 
among the most important in the economy. These actively managed funds control a sizeable stake 
of corporate equity and play a pivotal role in the determination of stock prices (see, e.g., 
Grinblatt, Titman and Wermers (1995), Gompers and Metrick (2001)). At the beginning of 1980, 
they held 4.6% of all U.S. equity, but that number increased to 32.4% by the end of 2007 (French 
(2008)). Over the corresponding period, the fraction of U.S. equity directly held by individuals 
fell from 47.9% to 21.5%. 
The economics literature on mutual funds has largely focused on two issues. The first, 
which dates back to Jensen (1968), is whether managers are able to beat the market. The 
consensus is that a typical manager is not able to earn enough returns to justify her fee; i.e., funds 
under-perform benchmarks by about 65 basis points per year after expenses (see Malkiel (1995) 
and Gruber (1996)). The second is the agency problem between individual investors and mutual 
fund companies arising out of delegated portfolio management. An important message of this 
literature is that performance-based incentives related to fund flows influence the risk-taking 
behavior of fund managers (see, e.g., Brown, Harlow and Starks (1996), Chevalier and Ellison 
(1997, 1999)). 
The role of organization in shaping the incentives and performance of mutual funds has 
received less attention in the literature. There are two main types of firms in this industry. The 
first is mutual fund companies (i.e. families or complexes) that market and distribute thousands of 
funds to retail investors.  Examples are well-known brand names like Fidelity and Vanguard. The 
                                                 
1 From 2001 to 2003, the number of households with mutual funds fell to 53.3 million from 56.3 million, 
but the percentage of U.S. households with mutual funds is still near an all time high of 47.8 percent 
(Investment Company Institute (2007)). 
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second is investment advisors who manage the portfolios of these funds and often have little role 
in marketing mutual funds to individual investors. A little recognized fact is that mutual fund 
companies often outsource the management of their funds to sub-advisory firms. For example, 
while Vanguard’s index funds are managed in-house, a number of their actively-managed funds 
are run (in part or completely) by external investment advisory firms. 
In a typical outsourcing arrangement, the family retains the marketing and distribution 
fees while the external advisor obtains the management fees. Like for any of its funds, the family 
of an outsourced fund, through a board of directors, keeps track of its performance and monitors 
fund activities such as the fund’s risk-taking behavior relative to its peers. The family retains the 
ability to replace the external advisor or close down the fund, while the external advisor can 
manage outsourced funds for other families as well funds they market themselves. Mutual fund 
investors are typically not aware if the managements of their funds are outsourced or not.2 
In this paper, we investigate the relationship between firm boundaries, incentives and 
performance in the mutual fund industry. We build a unique database from 1994 to 2007 that 
tracks for each year whether a fund is at least partially outsourced or fully managed internally. 
We take the CRSP Mutual Fund Database, which has information on fund families and their 
funds, and merge it with the Thomson Mutual Fund Holdings Database,3 which reports the names 
of the investment advisory companies managing these funds. In conjunction with an SEC 
database of filings by investment advisory companies, we are able to identify the relationships 
between investment sub-advisors and mutual fund families. A fund is categorized as being 
outsourced if one of its investment advisors is not affiliated with the mutual fund family.4 
We begin our analysis by comparing the performance of outsourced funds to funds ran 
internally. Depending on performance benchmarks, we find that outsourced funds under-perform 
                                                 
2 We thank Burton Malkiel for providing a number of the stylized facts regarding outsourcing arrangements 
in the mutual fund industry. 
3 Formerly called “CDA/Spectrum Mutual Fund Holdings Database”. 
4 The SEC defines affiliated as having either ownership of or some controlling interest in the other party. 
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other funds by between 50.4 and a 72.0 basis points a year. These are sizeable effects given that 
the typical equity fund in our sample under-performs the performance benchmark by 80.4 basis 
points a year and charge roughly 130 basis points a year in expenses.  
There are a few potential explanations for this under-performance. First, a fund being 
outsourced may be a signal that it is being run on the cheap. To see if this is the case, we include 
controls for fund size and management fees and find that the under-performance remains. We 
also add in as controls a fund’s family size, past fund flows, turnover and fund age and find that 
the under-performance result is not driven by such observable characteristics. More generally, we 
include fund family and advisor fixed effects to account for any fixed unobserved family and 
advisor characteristics and find similar results. Lastly, we turn to an instrumental variable 
approach to further determine the causal relationship between outsourcing and underperformance. 
Having established a relationship between outsourcing and under-performance, we 
consider an explanation due to Holmstrom (1999). In his rendition of the main theories of the 
firm,5 he argues that contractual externalities due to firm boundaries make it more difficult to 
extract output from an outsourced relationship than from an employee within the firm.6 
Moreover, in a multi-task principal-agent setting, the firm optimally wants to use lower-powered 
incentives to extract output from an employee, but has to rely on higher-powered incentives, such 
as replacement of fund managers or closures of funds, in an outsourcing relationship due to the 
inability to coordinate incentives with the external firm.7 
                                                 
5 See Coase (1937), Williamson (1975), Klein, Crawford and Alchian (1978), Grossman and Hart (1986) 
and Hart and Moore (1990). 
6 Ideas in Holmstrom (1999) build on Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991, 1994). Other papers on the theory of 
the firm include Bolton and Whinston (1993), Aghion and Tirole (1997), Baker, Gibbons, and Murphy 
(2002), and Stein (2002). 
7 Implicit in Holmstrom (1999) are measurement costs (i.e. the costs of getting a better measure of how 
output depend on effort, manipulation, etc.). He discusses other settings that can yield similar predictions. 
For instance, the firm may have additional information about an employee other than past performance 
(e.g., how often he shows up to work) and may not need to rely as much on past performance. We do not 
attempt to distinguish between different alternatives within the contractual externalities characteristic of 
imperfect information environments. 
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The mutual fund industry maps nicely into this framework of firm boundaries creating 
contractual externalities. An external advisory firm owns the technology that produces 
performance and gets the right to assign their employees to tasks. There is typically no 
coordination of task assignments or incentives between the principal and the sub-advisor. So 
when a family farms out the management of a fund to an external advisory firm, the family 
typically does not have control over a number of crucial variables. These include employees the 
advisory firm assigns to work on its fund and whether the advisory firm is providing enough time 
and resources to those employees. Indeed, we know that external advisors often manage multiple 
funds for different families as well as other types of institutional investors such as pension funds 
and university endowments. In contrast, if the advisor was inside the firm, the family has more 
control over task assignments and hence has more levers to oversee the employees with. As a 
result, we should see outsourced funds under-perform funds managed in-house. 
To distinguish our hypothesis from alternatives, we test two key auxiliary implications of 
this hypothesis. First, the family has to lean more heavily on high-powered incentives related to 
realized returns and other observable metrics for outsourced funds than if the advisor was part of 
the firm.8 We use two measures of family-fund incentives in the mutual fund literature: the 
sensitivity of fund closures to past performance and the sensitivity of fund closures to excess risk-
taking relative its peers (see, e.g., Chevalier and Ellison (1999), Sirri and Tufano (1998)). We 
find that outsourced funds do indeed face steeper incentives than in-house funds. We also find 
that closures for outsourced funds are more sensitive to excess risk-taking, using two measures of 
risk-taking from the literature: the deviation of fund betas from its peers or the degree of 
idiosyncratic risk. Second, we also expect that outsourced funds, because they face steeper 
incentives than funds managed in-house, should take less risk in response (see Chevalier and 
                                                 
8 It may seem counter-intuitive that outsourced funds face steeper incentives and do worse. But the point of 
Holmstrom (1999) is that outsourced funds would do even worse otherwise. One should view these two 
auxiliary implications as symptoms that go along with the under-performance of outsourced funds. 
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Ellison (1999)). We compare the risk-taking behavior outsourced funds to their in-house 
counterparts and find that outsourced funds take less risk. 
Our paper proceeds as follows. We first discuss the related literature in Section II. We 
describe the data, our identification scheme for outsourced funds and summary statistics 
regarding them in Section III. We document the performance of outsourced funds in Section IV. 
In Section V, we study the incentives and risk-taking profiles of outsourced mutual funds relative 
to funds managed in-house. We consider various robustness checks of our results in Section VI, 
and conclude in Section VIII.     
 
II. Related Literature 
There are other recent papers that examine various aspects of mutual fund subadvisory 
arrangements. Cashman and Deli (2009) look at these arrangements by constructing a different 
data set based on N-SAR filings with the SEC, but only for the year 2002. Their main focus is on 
how decision rights vary by fund style (equity versus debt, corporate debt versus government 
debt). Del Guercio, Reuter and Tkac (2010) look in detail at a comprehensive sample of sub-
advisory contracts for domestic equity mutual funds in 2002 and analyze the distribution channels 
of portfolio management services. Kuhnen (2009) tests whether the decision to approve 
subadvisory contracts are influenced by social network connections of mutual fund boards. In 
comparison, our focus on the relationships between boundaries and incentives and performance is 
absent from these papers. 
More broadly speaking, our paper links two strands of economics literature.  The first is 
the emerging literature on how mutual fund families influence performance and activities of 
individual mutual funds. The second is on the nature of how organizational structure affects the 
way firms conduct business. 
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A.  Interpretations of our findings for the mutual fund literature 
There is an emerging literature that examines the influences of mutual fund families on 
mutual funds.9 Massa (2003) documents that investors tend to pick a fund family first and then 
choose to invest in funds offered by the family from their menu. In response, mutual fund 
families offer greater degree of product differentiation that negatively affects performance. 
Gasper, Massa and Matos (2006) show that mutual fund families may subsidize the performance 
of a favorable fund in the family at the expense of another fund. Part of this is explained through 
the allocation of under-priced initial public offering to a favored fund in the family. Kacperczyk, 
Sialm and Zheng (2008) confirm this result and documents that mutual funds have other hidden 
costs, such as agency costs, which affect performance. These papers present direct performance 
subsidization as one possible mechanism, but they leave unexplained significant part of the 
observed differences. 
These findings suggest that that families (or advisors) subsidize their own funds, but not 
for funds for which they act an advisor. Hence, they are consistent with the multi-task agency 
model of Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991) that we are trying to establish in more detail. It may be 
difficult for the family to extract performance from an advisor because they may have funds of 
their own (or have other objectives). Direct performance subsidization is a specific example of 
the mechanisms regarding the lack of resources and effort that are devoted to an outsourced fund 
by its advisor. 
Our paper complements these findings by highlighting the importance of firm boundaries 
and providing clearer economic foundations necessary to understand these results. The mutual 
fund literature documents other instances where agency costs and conflicts of interest lead to 
inefficient outcomes. For example, Edelen and Kadlec (2006) consider the agency costs within a 
                                                 
9 Mamaysky and Spiegel (2002) and Gervais, Lynch and Musto (2005) analyze the organization of 
investment management firms from a theoretical perspective. Massa (1997) examines causes and effects of 
product proliferation in the mutual fund industry. 
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fund between the portfolio managers who make investment decisions and traders who execute 
them, and find conflicts of interest that lead to fund underperformance. Stoughton, Wu and 
Zechner (2008) consider a model with financial intermediation by investment advisory services 
where brokered mutual funds may underperform direct channel mutual funds. Our paper shows 
that due to firm boundaries, there are agency costs that make it more difficult for the mutual fund 
family to extract performance from an outsourced mutual fund. Consistent with the agency story 
of Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991), we document that these firm boundaries also affect fund 
closure decisions and fund risk-taking behavior. 
 
B.  Relation of our findings to the organizational economics literature 
More broadly, our paper establishes the importance of organizations for the mutual fund 
industry and clarifies the effects of firm boundaries on incentives and performance. Related 
papers attempt to test the basic Grossman-Hart-Moore insight in other settings. Notable examples 
include Baker and Hubbard (2004) whose work examines the trucking industry and the question 
of whether drivers should own the trucks they operate. Simester and Wernerfelt (2005) look at the 
ownership of tools in the carpentry industry. Berger, Miller, Petersen, Rajan and Stein (2005) 
attempt to understand whether small organizations are better at carrying out certain specific tasks 
than large organizations in the context of banks. Chen, Hong, Huang and Kubik (2004) tackle the 
same question using mutual funds. The common idea behind these recent studies is that one can 
learn something useful by examining in detail how different types of organizations behave when 
faced with similar tasks. This is a different approach than the standard one of trying to explain 
organizational form (e.g., integration vs. non-integration) based on a variety of industry 
characteristics. 
Our paper is also related to recent work on how the nature of an organization affects both 
the way that a firm conducts its business and the kinds of activities that it can efficiently 
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undertake. Guedj and Scharfstein (2005) and Guedj (2006) look at the strategies and performance 
of big pharmaceutical firms, start-up firms and joint ventures between the two in comparison to 
internal projects of big firms. They find that joint ventures (which may be viewed as being similar 
to an outside manager) are less performance sensitive than internal investment and have worse 
outcomes on average. Their setting is different from ours in a number of ways and hence we 
would expect different results. First, their joint ventures involve investment on the part of both 
firms whereas mutual fund families rely exclusively on the external advisory company to manage 
the fund. There is more of a principal-agent problem in our context and hence the model of 
Holmstrom (1999) regarding coordinating incentives is more appropriate. Second, whereas an 
advisory company manages many different funds, the joint ventures typically involve only one 
project for the smaller firm and hence the issues of multi-tasking seem more appropriate for our 
setting. Nonetheless, we sound a cautionary note from this comparison that our findings only hold 
under certain contexts where the assumptions of Holmstrom (1999) apply. 
 
III. Data and Identification Scheme for Outsourced Funds 
Our paper utilizes three databases. The first, the CRSP Mutual Fund Database, goes back 
to the 1960’s.10 It provides information about fund performance along with a host of fund 
characteristics such as assets under management, expenses, age, the names of the managers, and 
investment styles.11 Importantly, it also gives the name of the fund family or complex that each 
                                                 
10 The CRSP Mutual Fund Database experienced a significant change in the database structure and 
historical content with the data release ending in September 2007. Our data consists of an initial database 
ending in December 2004 and later updated to include observations from January 2005 to December 2007 
based on a newer release. 
11 We first select mutual funds with Investment Company Data, Inc. (ICDI) mutual fund objective of 
“aggressive growth” or “long-term growth” and categorize these funds as “Aggressive Growth” funds. We 
then add in mutual funds with Strategic Insight (SI) mutual fund objectives of “aggressive growth”, 
“flexible” or “growth”. We categorize funds with ICDI or SI objectives of “small-cap growth” as “Small-
Cap Growth” and categorize funds with ICDI or SI objectives of “growth-income” or “income-growth” as 
“Growth and Income”. We classify mutual funds with ICDI or SI objectives that contains the words 
“bond(s)”, “government”, “corporate”, “municipal” or “money market” as “Bond or Money Market”. 
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fund belongs to. The second is the Thomson Mutual Fund Holdings Database, which goes back to 
the early 1980’s. It details the portfolio holdings of each fund and provides the names of the 
investment advisory firms or sub-advisors managing the fund’s portfolio. This key piece of 
information is only available after 1993, and therefore, our analysis is limited to the post-1993 
period. The third is the SEC’s database of disclosures by investment advisors, which informs us if 
investment advisors are affiliated with fund families. 
We merge the first two mutual fund databases using the Mutual Fund Links (MFLINKS) 
tables developed by Wermers (2000). A mutual fund may enter our database multiple times in the 
same year if it has different share classes. We identify multiple share classes using the MFLINKS 
tables and create asset-weighted averages across share classes of variables of interest. We begin 
categorizing a fund as being outsourced or not by comparing the name of its family complex 
(provided by CRSP) to the names of its investment advisory firms (provided by Thomson). The 
latter database provides up to two names because two or more advisory firms may manage any 
single fund. To the extent that any of the names of the investment advisors does not match the 
name of the family complex, we identify that fund as a candidate for being outsourced.12 Because 
advisors with different names may still be affiliated, we look up the Form ADV of every family 
complex in our sample. If a candidate fund is contained in the same ownership structure, then we 
identify that fund as being managed in-house, and otherwise we identify it as being outsourced.13 
Therefore, the funds we identify as being outsourced have at least one investment advisor 
whose name differs from the name of the family complex and that advisor does not belong to the 
same ownership structure as the family complex. In total, we identify 37,227 fund-year 
                                                                                                                                                 
Mutual funds whose objective contains the words “sector”, “gold”, “metals”, “natural resources”, “real 
estate” or “utility” are considered “Sector” funds. We classify funds whose objective contains the words 
“international” or “global” or a name of a country or a region as “International” unless it is already 
classified. Finally, we categorize “balanced”, “income”, “special” or “total return” funds as “Balanced” 
funds. 
12 Since it is difficult to figure out the responsibilities of various sub-advisors on a fund, this is a 
conservative and sensible categorization. 
13 See the Supplemental Appendix for additional information on this process. 
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observations as being managed in-house, 14,574 as outsourced and 2,656 as left unidentified. In 
addition, we have randomly checked the outcomes of our identification scheme by downloading 
fund prospectuses from the Internet and found it to be fairly accurate. 
Table 1 reports by year the characteristics of mutual fund families in our sample. In the 
first column, we report the number of mutual fund companies in our sample. In 1994, there are 
345 companies. This number increases to a peak of 510 in 2000, and falls to 467 in 2007. In the 
second column, we report the average number of funds marketed per family by year. The typical 
family markets roughly eight funds, though this number has gone up somewhat over time. In the 
third column, we report the fraction of companies that does any outsourcing; roughly 43% of 
families outsource to some degree. In the fourth column, we report the fraction of funds per 
family that get outsourced; a typical family on average farms out the management of 26% of its 
funds. 
The last column of this panel reports the concentration in investment styles of the fund 
families in our sample. For each fund family, we calculate its modal style in a given year, which 
we define as the investment style with the majority of the family’s assets under management. A 
fund’s modal style is highly persistent across years, and around 73% of assets are in the modal 
style. This indicates that many families, even very big ones, tend to specialize and have a style in 
which they have expertise.   
In Table 2, we provide monthly descriptive statistics regarding the funds in our sample. 
We report means and standard deviations for the variables of interest by all funds, in-house funds 
and outsourced funds. In each month, our sample includes on average about 3079 funds. They 
have average total net assets (TNA) of 683 million dollars, with a standard deviation of 1770 
million dollars. Note that outsourced funds tend to be smaller than in-house funds (425 million 
compared to 771 million dollars). For the usual reasons related to scaling, the proxy of fund size 
that we will use in our analysis is the log of a fund’s total net assets under management or TNA 
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(LOGTNA). We measure fund family size in two ways. The first measure is LOGFAMFUNDS, 
which is the log of the number of funds in the fund’s family. This measure captures the number of 
product lines a fund family markets. Another family size measure is LOGFAMSIZE, which is the 
log of one plus the cumulative TNA of the other funds in the fund’s family (i.e. the TNA of a 
fund’s family excluding its own TNA). Outsourced funds tend to be from smaller families in 
terms of fund family assets than in-house ones but come from families with similar number of 
products.   
The funds in our sample have expense ratios as a fraction of year-end TNA (EXPRATIO) 
that average about 1.3 percent per year. The expense ratios of outsourced funds do not differ from 
in-house funds. Fund turnover (TURNOVER) is defined as the minimum of purchases and sales 
over average TNA for the calendar year. The average fund turnover is 87.6 percent per year.  
Outsourced funds do not have substantial differenced in turnover than their in-house counterparts 
(81.4% compared to 89.3%). The average fund age (AGE) is about 10.3 years, and outsourced 
funds tend to be younger (7.9 years to 11.1 years). Funds charge a total load (TOTLOAD) of 
about 2.3 percent (as a percentage of new investments) on average; outsourced funds charge a 
slightly lower total load than in-house ones. FLOW in month t is defined as the fund’s TNA in 
month t minus the product of the fund’s TNA at month t-12 with the net fund return between 
months t-12 and t, all divided by the fund’s TNA at month t-12. The funds in the sample have an 
average fund flow of about 42.8 percent a year. FLOW does not appear to depend on outsourcing 
status.  PRET is the past one-year cumulative market-adjusted return of the fund.14 
 
IV. Outsourcing and Mutual Fund Performance 
                                                 
14 Expense ratios reported in CRSP Mutual Fund Database seem to have some extreme outliers on the 
positive side that appear to be erroneous. We winsorize EXPRATIO above at the 99.9% level in each 
period. PRET is also winsorized above and below at the 99.9% and 0.1% levels in each period. 
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Our empirical strategy utilizes cross-sectional variation to see how mutual fund 
performance varies with whether a fund is outsourced or managed in-house. One major worry 
that arises when using cross-sectional variation is that outsourcing is correlated with other 
observables that affect performance. For instance, funds that are outsourced might be less likely 
than funds managed in-house to pursue strategies that have been documented to generate 
abnormal returns, such as small stock, value stock and price momentum strategies. Therefore, we 
control for performance factors that reflect these strategies as well as factor exposures to the 
domestic equity market, the international market and the bond market. Moreover, a fund’s 
outsourcing status might be correlated with other fund characteristics such as fund size and family 
size, and it may be these characteristics that are driving performance. For instance, smaller funds 
are more likely to be outsourced, so we have to be careful in dealing with fund size when making 
performance inferences regarding outsourcing because fund size strongly predicts performance 
(see Chen, Hong, Huang and Kubik (2004)). We first discuss our main model specification and 
discuss various robustness checks later in Section VI. 
 
A. Fund Performance Benchmarks 
One way to deal with the concern about heterogeneity in fund strategies is to adjust for 
fund performance using various benchmarks. We use in addition to simple market-adjusted 
returns, returns adjusted by the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) of Sharpe (1964) and 
Lintner (1965). We also use returns adjusted using the Fama and French (1993) three-factor 
model augmented with a factor reflecting momentum effect of Jegadeesh and Titman (1993).15 
This four-factor model has been shown in various contexts to provide explanatory power for the 
observed cross-sectional variation in fund performance of equity funds (see, e.g., Carhart 
                                                 
15 Among these are the returns on the CRSP value weighted stock index net of the one-month Treasury rate 
(VWRF), the returns to the Fama and French (1993) SMB (small stocks minus large stocks) and HML (high 
book-to-market stocks minus low book-to-market stocks) portfolios, and the returns to price momentum 
portfolio UMD (a portfolio that is long stocks that are past twelve month winners and short stocks that are 
past twelve month losers and hold for one month). 
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(1997)).16 To be more conservative because we have balanced and international funds in our 
sample, we consider a six-factor model and augment this four-factor model with the Morgan 
Stanley Capital International index return (MSCI) that includes Europe, Australia and the Far 
East, and the Lehman Aggregate Bond Index (LABI) return, both in excess of the one-month 
Treasury rate.     
Because we are interested in the relationship between outsourcing and performance, we 
sort mutual funds into two portfolios at the beginning of each month, those that are outsourced 
and those that are not. We also treat equity funds separately from non-equity funds because they 
have different drivers of performance. Because fund size is both a strong predictor of outsourcing 
status and performance (see Chen, Hong, Huang and Kubik (2004)), we calculate the loadings of 
outsourced versus in-house funds within fund size quintiles according to their TNA. We use the 
entire time series of these twenty equal-weighted portfolios monthly net returns to calculate the 
loadings on the various factors (VWRF, SMB, HML, UMD, MSCI and LABI). For each month, 
each mutual fund inherits the loadings of one of these twenty portfolios that it belongs to. 
Overall, we find that there is not much difference in the market beta (i’s) between in-
house and outsourced funds, but the alphas of the outsourced funds are smaller in each size 
quintile of funds.17 The average alpha of equity funds managed in-house is –5.4 basis points per 
month, while the average alpha of outsourced equity funds is –10.2 basis points per month. 
Annualized, this difference in alphas is 57.6 basis points per year, with a t-statistic of 4.16. 
However, it is difficult to gauge the significance of this difference in this set-up given the lack of 
controls for other fund characteristics. Also, it is worthwhile noting that the average equity fund 
in our sample under-performs the six-factor model by 80.4 basis points per year. Outsourced non-
equity funds also have smaller alphas for each size quintile. Averaged across the five portfolios, 
                                                 
16 See Elton and Gruber (1997) for a review of multi-index models and performance measurement. 
17 Detailed estimates of factor loadings and alphas are available in a separate supplement tables. 
 14
the alphas are smaller by 84.0 basis points per year with a t-statistic of 3.37, though the correct 
significance of the difference is still difficult to ascertain without additional controls. 
  
B. Cross-sectional Performance Regressions 
To deal with the concern related to the correlation of fund performance with other 
observable fund characteristics, we analyze the relationship between outsourcing and 
performance in the regression framework proposed by Fama and MacBeth (1973), where we can 
control for the effects of other fund characteristics on performance. Specifically, the regression 
specification that we utilize is   
FUNDRETi,t =   +  OUTSOURCEDi,t-1 +  Xi,t-1 +  i,t        (1) 
where FUNDRETi,t is the alpha of fund i in month t adjusted by various performance benchmarks, 
 is a constant, OUTSOURCEDi,t-1 is an indicator for whether or not a fund is outsourced, and Xi,t-
1 is a set of control variables (in month t-1) that includes LOGTNAi,t-1, LOGFAMFUNDSi,t-1, 
LOGFAMSIZEi,t-1, EXPRATIOi,t-1, TURNOVERi,t-1, AGEi,t-1,  TOTLOADi,t-1, FLOWi,t-1, and PRETi,t-
1. i,t is an error term that is uncorrelated with all other independent variables. The coefficient of 
interest is , which captures the relationship between outsourcing and fund performance, 
controlling for other fund characteristics. The coefficient  is the vector of loadings on the control 
variables. We then take the estimates from these monthly regressions and follow Fama and 
MacBeth (1973) in taking their time series means and standard deviations to form our overall 
estimates of the effects of fund characteristics on performance. We adjust for serial correlations 
using Newey and West (1987) estimates of standard errors with lags of order three. 
In Table 3, we report the estimation results for the regression specification given in 
Equation (1) using fund returns before expenses (gross fund returns). Notice that the coefficient 
in front of OUTSOURCED is negative and statistically significant across the four performance 
measures. The coefficient using market-adjusted returns is -0.060 with a t-statistic of 4.32. This 
 15
means that outsourced funds under-perform funds managed in-house by about 72.0 basis points a 
year. The corresponding coefficient is -0.058 for CAPM-adjusted returns with a t-statistic of 4.05. 
The magnitudes are somewhat smaller when we use the four- and six-factor models: -0.046 with a 
t-statistic of 3.31 and -0.042 with a t-statistic of 3.10. So an outsourced fund under-performs other 
funds between 50.4 and 72.0 basis points a year. 
To put these magnitudes into some perspective, we compare our fund under-performance 
result to other findings regarding mutual fund performance. A typical equity mutual fund has a 
performance net of expenses that under-performs the benchmark. Gruber (1996) shows that 
average equity mutual fund under-performs a four-factor model by about 65 basis points per year. 
In our sample, the average equity mutual fund under-performs a six-factor model by 80.4 basis 
points per year. A part of this mutual fund under-performance can be attributed to annual expense 
ratio that averages 130 basis points a year. Therefore, a reduction in fund performance of 
anywhere from 50.4 to 72.0 basis points a year is economically quite significant in comparison.18 
There are a few potential explanations for this under-performance. First, a fund being 
outsourced may be a signal that it is being run on the cheap; i.e., the external advisor may not get 
the same management fees as funds managed in-house. This is unlikely to be an explanation 
because earlier mutual fund studies typically find that funds with higher management fees 
actually under-perform.19 Nonetheless, to rule out this explanation, remember that we include in 
the cross-sectional performance regression controls for management fees and fund size (because 
the size of the fund in conjunction with fees determines the incentive package for the advisor). 
With fund returns gross of fees as our dependent variable, the coefficient in front of fees is 
insignificant, consistent with earlier studies. Fund size also attracts a negative coefficient 
consistent with the results of Chen, Hong, Huang and Kubik (2004) who argue that the fund size 
                                                 
18 When calibrated to the cross-sectional distribution of alphas derived from Kosowski, Timmermann, 
Wermers, and White (2006), our result is similar to taking a fund at the 70th percentile of their distribution 
of alphas and making that fund the 30th percentile fund. 
19 See Elton, Gruber and Blake (2003) for a study of incentives fees and mutual fund performance. 
 16
finding is associated with liquidity and organizational diseconomies. So the under-performance of 
outsourced funds is not simply due to outsourced funds having lower management fees. We also 
include as controls a fund’s family size, asset size of the family, turnover, fund age, past fund 
flows, and past returns. Notably, family assets size also comes in with a significant positive sign, 
also consistent with Chen, Hong, Huang and Kubik (2004). Past fund performance also comes in 
significantly, which is consistent with earlier research. Despite these controls for observable 
characteristics, we continue to find that outsourced funds under-perform. 
 
C. Cross-Sectional Performance Regressions with Advisor and Family Fixed Effects 
We also include family fixed effects and advisor fixed effects in the cross-sectional 
performance regressions presented in Equation (1). When we include family fixed effects, we 
omit family characteristics such as family size and family assets from the specification. Family 
fixed effects control for any unobserved heterogeneity across families; in essence, the fixed effect 
specification allows us to compare the performance of funds managed in-house to performance of 
outsourced funds within the same families. Similarly, we also include advisor fixed effects. This 
allows us to also measure the outsourcing effect by comparing the performance of funds managed 
by an advisory firm on its own behalf to funds that it manages for other families. This 
specification allows us to rule out the possibility that poorly managed mutual fund families tend 
to outsource more, or superior fund advisors tend to only manage in-house funds. 
We report the estimation results including these fixed effects in Table 4.  The overall 
results are roughly unchanged; the coefficient in front of OUTSOURCED remains negative and 
statistically significant across all four performance measures. The coefficients range from –0.045 
to –0.037, indicating that an outsourced fund under-performs funds managed in-house by 
anywhere from 44.4 to 54.0 basis points per year. The t-statistics are all smaller (not surprisingly 
given the addition of the fixed effects), but they remain statistically significant. The effects of 
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fund size and past returns on future performance also remain significant with family and advisor 
fixed effects. 
Overall, our Fama-MacBeth performance regressions illustrate that outsourced mutual 
funds under-perform mutual funds managed in-house funds. This relationship persists when we 
control for fund and family characteristics. The addition of family and advisor fixed-effects also 
does not alter this relationship. 
 
D.  Instrumental Variables Analysis 
Finally, we employ an instrumental variables strategy to document the causal effect of 
outsourcing on mutual fund performance. If a fund family is increasing the number of product 
offerings relative to its asset base, that family might be more likely to outsource the creation of a 
fund rather than build it in-house. We propose an instrument for whether or not a fund is 
outsourced based on the characteristics of the fund’s family at the inception date of the fund. The 
instrument is the number of funds a family offers at the time a fund is started, controlling for the 
family asset size. We also control for the number of funds in the family and family asset size at 
the time performance is measured. To have a good instrument, we need the number of funds in a 
family to be correlated with whether or not a fund is outsourced. That is, we need a strong first 
stage regression. 
Furthermore, we need to assume an exclusion restriction for our specification in the 
second stage regression. Our exclusion restriction is that, controlling for other variables, the 
number of funds in a family at the time of fund inception is only correlated with the performance 
of that fund because of the outsourcing decision, and not for any other reason. We continue to 
control for contemporaneous family size and number of funds in a family, but we are assuming 
that past number of funds in a family affects performance only through the outsourcing decision 
made at the time of fund inception. We cannot think of any obvious economic stories for why this 
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assumption would be false and hence we believe that the underlying exclusion restriction behind 
our instrument is a plausible one.   
We proceed with a two-stage estimation method where the first stage regression models 
the outsourcing decision by the family at the time of fund inception. We define 
LOGFAMFUNDSi,0 (LOGFAMFUNDS AT INCEPTION) with a ‘0’ subscript to be the log of one 
plus the number of funds in the fund family at the time the fund is launched. In addition, we 
define LOGFAMSIZEi,0 (LOGFAMSIZE AT INCEPTION) as the natural logarithm of one plus the 
size of the fund family when the fund was launched. The first stage is a logit regression:  
Prob(OUTSOURCEDi,t = 1) =  ( + LOGFAMFUNDSi,0 + LOGFAMSIZEi,0  
 LOGFAMFUNDSi,t + LOGFAMSIZEi,t  
                        +  Xi,t-1 + It )      (2) 
where OUTSOURCEDi,t is a dummy variable that equals one if fund i is outsourced in year t and 
zero otherwise. The notation (•) indicates the logistic cumulative distribution function and  is 
the vector of coefficients. Xi,t-1 is the same set of control variables from Equation (1) and the 
model includes time (monthyear) effects represented by It.   
 The results of this logit first stage regression are presented in Table 5. The first stage is 
strong; the coefficient on LOGFAMFUNDS AT INCEPTION is positive and statistically 
significant, indicating that funds created by families with more existing funds are more likely to 
outsource their new fund. The magnitude of the coefficient suggests that a one standard deviation 
increase in the log number of funds in a family at the time of inception (1.86) increases the 
likelihood that a fund is outsourced by 3.5771.86=6.66%. This is substantial considering that 
roughly 28% of funds in our sample are outsourced. The precision of the estimate on 
LOGFAMFUNDS AT INCEPTION (t-stat = 4.71) also suggests that we do not have a problem 
with a weak instrument. 
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 Given that the first stage is a non-linear model (logit), we do not use 2SLS but instead use 
two-stage residual inclusion (2SRI) first proposed by Hausman (1978).20 The second stage 
specification is: 
FUNDRETi,t =   +  OUTSOURCEDi,t-1 + LOGFAMSIZEi,0  
 +LOGFAMFUNDSi,t + LOGFAMSIZEi,t +  Xi,t-1  
 + It +  FIRST STAGE RESIDUALSi,t + i,t    (3) 
where FIRST STAGE RESIDUALS is the residuals from the estimation of Equation (2), and other 
variables are defined as above. Note that the only explanatory variable from the first-stage 
regression that has been excluded from list of explanatory variables of the second-stage 
regression is our instrument, LOGFAMFUNDS AT INCEPTION. We estimate Equation (3) as a 
pooled panel regression with standard errors clustered by family. 
The results of the second-stage are presented in Table 6. Depending on the performance 
measures, we find that the coefficient of FIRST STAGE RESIDUALS is slightly statistically 
significant. This coefficient represents an augmented regression test and its significance suggests 
that data supports an endogenous effect in our model specification (Hausman, 1978). Controlling 
for this endogeneity, the effect of being outsourced on performance is negative and statistically 
different from zero, using any of our mutual fund performance measures. The range of our 
estimates suggests that being outsourced reduces performance by 1.20% to 1.68% per year. So if 
anything, we uncover a stronger effect by controlling for endogeneity rather than a weaker one. 
Therefore, we conclude that our results are robust to this instrumental variable strategy.21 
 
V. Outsourcing and Family Complex-Fund Incentives 
                                                 
20 See, for example, Terza et al. (2008) for a description of this procedure.  
21 This difference is not being driven by the fact that we are running a pooled regression here but our OLS 
results were from Fama-MacBeth regressions.  When we run a pooled panel regression version of the 
Fama-MacBeth performance regressions of Table 4 and 5, our main results are largely unchanged. 
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Having established a link between outsourcing and fund performance, we now consider 
an explanation due to Holmstrom (1999) who, in his version of the main theories of the firm, 
points out that contractual externalities due to firm boundaries make it more difficult to extract 
output from an outsourced relationship than from an employee within the firm. The idea is that in 
a multi-task principal-agent setting, the firm optimally wants to use lower-powered incentives to 
extract output from an employee, but has to rely on higher-powered incentives in an outsourcing 
relationship due to the inability to coordinate incentives with the other firm.   
It is important to note that the starting point of the Holmstrom theory is that these higher-
powered incentives are still imperfect because they are all second-best solutions. In other words, 
there does not exist a feasible technology such that the family can get back to a first-best world of 
in-house management. A family would not want to use outsourced management unless capacity 
constraints or associated costs of in-house production made the family use the outsource option. 
This is the premise of our instrument for outsourcing earlier. The family does optimally choose its 
mix of in-house versus out-source given all constraints/costs and demand. In this sense, it is 
indifferent at its first-order condition but subject to a set of constraints. 
In conjunction with the under-performance of outsourced funds, this theory has two key 
and testable auxiliary implications. First, an outsourced fund faces higher-powered incentives, 
which we measure using closures of funds due to poor past performance or excessive risk-taking. 
And second, its risk-taking profile should deviate less for outsourced funds than from other funds 
with similar investment styles.  
 
A. Sensitivity of Fund Closures to Past Performance 
We begin by seeing if there is a relationship between firm boundaries and whether a fund 
complex relies more on higher-powered incentives for outsourced funds. We use a standard 
measure of mutual fund incentives in the mutual fund literature: the sensitivity of fund closures 
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(controlled by the family) to past performance (due to the advisor or manager). We estimate the 
following logit regression specification: 
Prob(CLOSEDi,t = 1) =  ( +  Zi,t-1)       (4) 
CLOSEDi,t is a dummy variable that equals one if fund i is closed in year t and zero otherwise. 
The notation (•) indicates the logistic cumulative distribution function and  is the vector of 
coefficients. A fund is defined as closed in year t if it does not have a full set (twelve months) of 
fund returns in that year. We denote  as a constant and Zi,t-1 as a vector of fund characteristics 
(measured at the end of year t-1) that includes an indicator for whether the fund is outsourced 
(OUTSOURCEDi,t-1) and an indicator for whether it is in the modal style of its family 
(INMODALSTYLEi,t-1). The latter variable controls for the possibility that a fund family is more 
likely to close down products outside of the area of their expertise. The other independent 
variables of interest in Zi,t-1 are as before and include LOGTNAi,t-1, LOGFAMFUNDSi,t-1, 
LOGFAMSIZEi,t-1, EXPRATIOi,t-1, TURNOVERi,t-1, AGEi,t-1, TOTLOADi,t-1, FLOWi,t-1 and PRETi,t-1. 
Our main variables of interest are PRETi,t-1 and OUTSOURCEDi,t-1. The idea here, motivated by 
the work of Chevalier and Ellison (1999), is to see if fund closures are more sensitive to poor past 
performance for outsourced funds than funds managed in-house. We will also include interactions 
of these variables as additional independent variables as well as year dummies and fund 
investment style dummies in the regression specification. The standard errors are clustered at the 
family level. We also report the average marginal effects expressed as percentages in brackets. 
Table 7 reports the results. The first column shows the results for the baseline regression 
specification. In interpreting these results, it is useful to keep in mind that the mean probability 
that a fund is closed down in a given year is about 2.33%. The coefficient in front of 
OUTSOURCED is 0.738 and is statistically significant. Because exp(0.738)=2.09, the odds of an 
outsourced fund being closed is 109% greater than for a fund managed in-house. The marginal 
effect of OUTSOURCED is 0.913% per year, which is close to the difference between the mean 
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probability that an in-house fund is closed (1.95% per year) and the mean probability that an 
outsourced fund is closed (3.40% per year). The coefficient in front of PRET is negative (–0.043) 
and statistically significant (t-statistic of 8.76). A fund that has a one standard deviation lower 
past year return (13.5% return over the past year) increases the odds of closure by exp(–
0.04313.5)-1=79%. In terms of marginal effect (-0.049), a one standard deviation lower past 
year return increases the likelihood of fund closure by 0.04913.5% = 0.662% per year.   
In the second column, we add in an additional explanatory variable: the interaction of 
OUTSOURCED and PRET to see if outsourced funds face a differential sensitivity of closure to 
performance. Because the non-linearity of the logistic function makes statistical significance and 
marginal effects of interaction terms difficult to interpret, we follow Ai and Norton (2003) to 
account for the non-linear terms in computing marginal effects and their standard errors.22 We 
find that the coefficient on the interaction of OUTSOURCED with PRET is negative and 
statistically significant using both the conventional t-statistic and the Ai-Norton t-statistic. This 
indicates that outsourced funds are more likely to be closed down for poor performance than 
funds managed in-house. In terms of marginal effects, a 13.5% decrease in returns for an in-house 
fund increases the likelihood of being closed by –0.02813.5=0.378% per year. In contrast, a 
13.5% decrease in returns for an outsourced fund increases the likelihood of being closed by (–
0.028-0.070)13.5=1.323%. This difference is statistically significant. In short, outsourced funds 
face significantly steeper incentives than their in-house counterparts. 
We have to keep in mind that other types of heterogeneity may drive these results. For 
instance, outsourced funds tend to be smaller funds and smaller funds may face steeper 
incentives. Or outsourced funds tend to be younger and younger funds might be more easily 
closed. Fortunately, we have a host of fund characteristics (such as fund size and fund age) and 
                                                 
22  We calculate the marginal effects with the non-linear terms for each observation and report the average 
marginal effect. Using the Delta-method, we calculate the standard errors for each observation and take 
their averages. The t-statistic we report is the average marginal effect divided by the average standard error. 
For brevity, we only make these corrections for interaction terms of interest. 
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interact them with past fund returns to control for these alternative explanations in these closure 
regressions. 
We do this in the third and fourth columns of Table 7. We first add in additional 
interaction terms including PRETLOGTNA, PRETLOGFAMFUNDS, PRETLOGFAMSIZE, 
and PRETEXPRATIO. These interaction terms should pick up if our effect is due to 
OUTSOURCED proxying for LOGTNA, LOGFAMFUNDS, LOGFAMSIZE or EXPRATIO. The 
coefficient in front of PRETLOGTNA and PRETEXPRATIO are negative, indicating that 
smaller funds and funds with lower expense ratios face steeper incentives. The coefficient in front 
of PRETLOGFAMFUNDS and PRETLOGFAMSIZE are not statistically significant, indicating 
that family characteristics do no appear to drive steepness of incentives. These controls appear to 
have some explanatory power, but the coefficient in front of PRETOUTSOURCED is remains 
negative and statistically significant. So even with these controls, outsourced funds still face 
steeper incentives, suggesting that there is an independent outsourcing effect. 
We continue along this vein in the fourth column by adding in additional interaction 
terms including PRETTURNOVER, PRETAGE, PRETTOTLOAD and PRETFLOW. The 
estimates suggest that higher turnover, younger, higher load and funds experiencing outflow tend 
to face steeper incentives. However, even in the presence of these additional variables, the 
coefficient in front of PRETOUTSOURCED again still remains negative and statistically 
significant. Thus, it does appear that our finding that outsourced funds face steeper incentives is 
not driven by other omitted fund characteristics. 
Another concern, however, is that what is driving this result is that a fund being 
outsourced might be associated with the family’s lack of commitment to a new investment style. 
In other words, the fact that the fund is outsourced as opposed to managed in-house is an 
indication that the family is only dipping its feet in a new style and will pull out at the first sign of 
trouble. This is a very plausible alternative hypothesis that can explain our key result.   
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To deal with this alternative, we control for whether or not the fund is in the modal style 
of the family and interact this with fund size. If it is indeed a commitment issue, we would expect 
that small funds in non-modal styles face a much higher sensitivity to past performance and for 
this control to take out the effect of outsourcing interacted with past returns. To see if this is the 
case, we add in three new variables in the last column, including PRETINMODALSTYLE. 
Indeed, we find that the coefficient in front of PRETINMODALSTYLE is negative, suggesting 
that funds not in the modal style of the family are much more likely to be closed down for poor 
performance. This is consistent with our lack-of-commitment to new styles alternative.  However, 
the coefficient in front of PRETOUTSOURCED remains negative and statistically significant. 
So a lack of commitment to a new style does not appear to be driving our outsourcing effect.   
  
B. Sensitivity of Fund Closures to Fund Risk-Taking Behavior  
Another distinct implication of the firm boundaries-contractual externalities explanation 
is that we should see that the family more closely tracks other aspects of fund behavior of 
outsourced funds, notably its risk-taking profile and how it differs from other funds with similar 
investment style. We use two measures of risk-taking deviations from Chevalier and Ellison 
(1999). The first is the deviation of a fund’s beta from the average beta of funds in its class. We 
calculate a fund’s beta for each calendar year using the 6-factor model using the twelve monthly 
returns. For each factor f, fund i, in year t, we save the estimated βf,i,t and calculate the average 
ߚ௙,ప,௧തതതതതത for each mutual fund style. The beta deviation risk measure for fund i in year t is defined as 
the square-root of total squared deviations from the style means of the six factor loadings. The 
second risk-taking measure is a fund’s idiosyncratic risk, defined as the standard deviation of 
idiosyncratic risk of the 6-factor model in percentages per month. We will call either of these two 
measures RISKDEV. 
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With these two measures, we re-estimate Equation (4) except that we now include 
RISKDEV and RISKDEVOUTSOURCED. The coefficient of interest is in front of the 
interaction, which tells us whether the sensitivity of fund closures to risk-taking deviations is 
different for OUTSOURCED funds. The results are reported in Table 8. 
The first two columns of Table 8 report the results for the beta-deviation risk measure. In 
the first column, the coefficient in front of OUTSOURCED remains positive and statistically 
significant. The coefficient in front of RISKDEV is negative (-0.128) and statistically significant 
(t-statistic of 2.09). A marginal effect of –0.132 indicates that fund that has a one standard 
deviation greater beta-deviation measure (one standard deviation is 1.99) decreases rather than 
increases the likelihood of closure by -0.1321.99=-0.263%. We would have expected this 
variable to come in positively since managers might be more penalized for taking excessive risk. 
However, we have an additional explanatory variable in the form of the interaction of 
OUTSOURCED and RISKDEV to see if outsourced funds face a different sensitivity of closure to 
risk-taking deviations. We find that the coefficient on this interaction is positive (0.356) and 
statistically significant (Ai-Norton t-statistic of 2.90), indicating that a family is more likely to 
close down an outsourced fund than a fund managed in-house for taking excessive risk. A one 
standard deviation increase in the beta-deviation for an outsourced fund increases the likelihood 
of being closed down by (-0.132+0.395)1.99=0.52% per year. In other words, outsourced funds 
are more likely to be penalized for risk-taking than their in-house counterparts. 
In the second column, we also include the interaction of OUTSOURCED and PRET to 
see if the effect of risk-deviation on incentives is independent of the effect of performance on 
incentives. When both interaction terms are included, we find that both interaction terms are 
slightly weakened, but they continue to enter significantly. In the last two columns of Table 8, we 
report the corresponding results for the idiosyncratic risk deviation measure. We find that the 
coefficient on this interaction is positive and statistically significant, indicating that outsourced 
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funds are more likely to be closed down for this type of risk-taking deviation. A one standard 
deviation increase in the idiosyncratic-risk deviation measure (one standard deviation is 0.85% 
per month) for an outsourced fund increases its likelihood of being closed down by (-
0.392+0.639)0.85=0.88% per year. Compared to mean closure probability of 2.33% per year, 
these are economically significant increases in closure probabilities. 
 
C. Outsourcing and Fund Risk-Taking Behavior    
We now look at the relationship between firm boundaries and fund risk-taking behavior. 
If outsourced funds do in fact face steeper incentives for risk-taking deviations, then in response, 
they ought to deviate less than other funds (see Chevalier and Ellison (1999)). We estimate the 
following linear pooled panel regression using our sample of equity funds to see how outsourcing 
affects RISKDEV: 
RISKDEVi,t-1 =   + Zi,t-1 +  i,t       (5) 
In Equation (5), Zi,t-1 is the vector of the same set of fund characteristics described earlier, and z 
denotes the vector of coefficients. We continue to include a dummy variable for each mutual fund 
investment style and year dummies but do not report their estimates.   
The results are presented in Table 9. From the first column, outsourced funds do have 
lower beta deviation than other funds; the coefficient in front of OUTSOURCED is -0.078 with a 
t-statistic of 3.72. In comparison, the coefficient in front of LOGTNA and PRET are –0.040 and 
0.005. Because a standard deviation of LOGTNA and PRET are 1.9 and 13.5, respectively, a fund 
with one-standard deviation larger assets or under-performance in the past one-year reduces beta 
risk deviation by –0.0401.9=-0.076 and 0.005-13.5=-0.065, respectively. Thus the effect of 
outsourcing on beta risk-taking is comparable to the effect of size on risk-taking and the effect of 
under-performance on risk-taking. In the second column of Table 9, we look at how outsourcing 
affects the fund idiosyncratic-risk deviations. The coefficient on OUTSOURCED is -0.066 (-
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0.066% per month) with a t-statistic of 3.36, and other coefficients remain qualitatively similar. 
The coefficients in front of LOGTNA and PRET are –0.027 and 0.002, respectively, so a fund 
with one standard deviation larger assets or under-performance reduces idiosyncratic risk 
deviation by –0.0271.9=-0.051 and 0.002-13.5=-0.027, respectively. Hence, an outsourced 
fund reduces risk-taking by slightly more than a fund with one-standard deviation larger size or 
under-performance. 
 
D. Outsourcing and Closet Indexing, IPO Allocations and Subsidies 
 We next relate our outsourcing measure to other measures of fund/family actions such as 
closet indexing or preferential IPO allocations. These are typically regarded as hidden actions 
because they are not easily observable by those outside of the manager’s organization, whether 
the principal be investors or the family that outsources its managerment. We expect our 
outsourcing measure to be correlated with some of these hidden actions because the premise of 
our risk-taking analysis is that outsourced funds are likely to take less risk and potentially take 
less effort and as a result become a closet indexer. Also, outsourced funds are less likely to 
benefit from preferential IPO allocations or other forms of subsidies that an in-house fund might 
benefit from. At the same time, there are other forms of unobservable effort and hence we expect 
that our outsourcing status measure, though correlated with these other hidden action measures, 
would still retain incremental explanatory power for performance when we control for these other 
measures of hidden action. 
We need to base our analysis on the holdings of mutual funds and look only at equity 
funds, the subsample of funds for which we have more detailed data. We gather the following 
three variables from the literature. The first is the return gap measure of Kacperczyk, Sialm and 
Zheng (2008); their measure is the difference between reported monthly fund returns, grossed up 
with expenses, and the returns reconstructed from portfolio holdings. The return gap also 
accounts for percentage of holdings held in cash and bonds. The second variable is the fund IPO 
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allocations measure of Gasper, Massa and Matos (2006).23  For our analysis, we designate a stock 
to be an IPO stock if it has been listed for six months or less at the time we observe portfolio 
holdings. We then calculate percentage of assets held in an IPO stock for each fund. The third 
variable is the  industry concentration index (ICI), a measure of closet indexing, as defined by 
Kacperczyk, Sialm and Zheng (2005). ICI is the sum of squared deviations of portfolio weights in 
industries from the market average, so higher ICI indicates a more concentrated portfolio. These 
measures reflect, in one form or another, measures of activeness/closet-indexing, IPO allocations 
and cross-subsidations.  
Our main results are reported in Table 10 and 11.  In the first colum of Table 10, we 
regress a fund’s return gap measure on our outsourcing status measure and a host of the usual 
fund characteristics. We find that there is no relationship between whether a fund is outsourced 
and its return gap. In the second column, we perform the same analysis using IPO allocations as 
the dependent variable. Here we find that outsourced funds are less likely to have IPO allocations. 
This is consistent with our auxiliary findings that outsourced funds take less risk. It might also 
reflect less preferential treatment on the part of the managing fund family. Both interpretations 
would be consistent with the outsourcing family having a harder time to extract value from the 
otusourced fund. In the third column, we find that outsourced funds are less likely to have a lower 
industry concentration index, again consistent with the finding that outsourced funds take less 
risk. 
In Table 11, we find that our outsourcing underperformance is robust to inclusion of 
these additional control variables. Consistent with Kacperczyk, Sialm and Zheng (2008), we find 
in column (1) of Table 11 that contemporaneous return gap is strongly correlated with gross fund 
returns. However, return gap does not erode our underperformance result, which suggests that 
underperformance is coming not only from unobserved actions by funds. When we regress fund 
                                                 
23 Gasper, Massa and Matos (2006) think of IPO allocations as families favoring some funds in the family 
at the expense of other funds in the same family. 
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performance on a firm’s IPO allocation in column (2), we find that the coefficient is positive 
though it is not statistically significant. In other words, funds with IPO allocations do better but 
this variable does not change the coefficient on our outsourcing status variable. Finally, when we 
regress gross fund returns on ICI in column (3), we get a positive coefficient, which indicates that 
a concentrated fund performs well and a closet-indexer (with industry weights closer to market 
average) tends to underperform other funds. However, again this control does not erode the 
underperformance of outsourced funds, which also indicates that there is more to the story than 
simply closet-indexing.  
In sum, Table 11 is consistent with outsourcing status containing information regarding 
unobservable effort that is not completely captured by the closet indexing or subsidization 
variables. As such, our outsourcing effect, while correlated is unique to these other hidden action 
measures identified in the literature.  
 
VI. Robustness Checks and Additional Analyses 
In this section, we first consider various robustness checks of our results. We simply 
summarize the checks here and the tables can be found in a Supplementary Appendix.  
 
A.  Robustness of Fund Performance Regressions 
We first consider various other ways of calculating the factor loadings used to estimate 
mutual fund performance. To estimate factor loadings, our base case specification splits funds 
into equity funds and non-equity funds, and then sorts funds on fund size and then on outsourcing 
status. Because past performance also may drive future performance, we have also tried sorting 
funds first by past twelve-months performance and then by outsourcing status. Furthermore, fund 
styles determine factor loadings; we have also tried sorting funds by style and then by 
outsourcing status. In either case, our results remain unchanged. Our base case specification also 
calculates factor loadings on returns net of expenses and we examine fund performance on returns 
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gross of expenses. We also calculate factor loadings on gross returns and examine fund 
performance on returns net of expenses. We have also estimated loadings using fund returns. The 
results are virtually identical in all these cases.  
In addition to using fund styles to estimate factor loadings, we also consider controlling 
for fund styles more directly. Even though the earlier summary statistics indicate that there are 
equal fractions of outsourced funds across styles, the summary statistics alone do not completely 
mitigate the concern that poorly performing styles are less likely to be outsourced. In particular, 
specialized funds such as those in international equity style or sector style might be more likely to 
be outsourced and funds in these styles might appear to out-perform relative to our 6-factor 
model. To address this concern, we remove international funds and sector funds from the data and 
repeat the performance regressions. We also consider including style fixed-effects in our 
regressions. In both cases, our results remain unchanged. 
We have also used portfolio holdings rather than style analysis to estimate performance 
benchmarks. The issue here is that our sample shrinks considerably and as a result the t-statistics 
are smaller. But the economic significance is very similar. 
We also consider a number of additional control variables for the fund performance 
regressions. One worry is that total management fees may not accurately capture the incentives 
on the part of the advisor. Hence, we break the management fee (EXPRATIO) into the 12B-1 fee, 
which is typically obtained by the family complex, and the remaining portion which is kept by the 
fund advisor. We also break the total sales load (TOTLOAD) into front-end load and rear-end load 
and find that our results are unchanged. Finally, we include more conventional advisor quality 
controls, rather than advisor fixed-effects, in the form of the number of funds managed by the 
advisor, size of the fund advisor, or the number of years the fund manager has managed the fund. 
We find similar results in all cases. 
 
B. Checks on Effects of Outsourcing on Fund Incentives  
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We also consider additional robustness checks of the effects of outsourcing on fund 
incentives. We find that the sensitivity of fund flows to past performance does not differ between 
in-house versus outsourced funds. Studies typically find, as we do, that fund flows are sensitive to 
performance. The interpretation given in the literature is that this sensitivity captures the reaction 
of investors to fund performance. To this extent, this finding is consistent with outside investors 
not being aware that a fund is outsourced and that the under-performance of outsourced funds is 
unlikely to be related to differences in incentives provided by outside investors vis-a-vis fund 
flows.   
As a check regarding the interpretation of the fund closure regressions related to past 
performance, we confront the lack-of-commitment alternative head on by calculating whether 
when an outsourced fund is shut down it means that the family pulls out of that style. The 
dependent variable is an indicator that the family no longer offers a fund (the next year) in the 
style of the fund that was closed. The probability that a family shuts a style when they close a 
fund in the data is 17%. The independent variables are the usual controls we use in other 
regressions and the coefficient of interest is on OUTSOURCED. We obtain a positive coefficient, 
which suggests that families are more likely to end a style when they close an outsourced fund 
compared to when they close other funds. But this coefficient is small and not statistically 
significant. In other words, it does not appear that outsourcing is a signal of a lack of family 
commitment toward a new style. 
We have also considered a number of other less compelling alternatives. For instance, 
perhaps the outsourcing effect reflects the fact that there are a lot of other funds in an outsourced 
fund’s style and so it is easy to replace that fund. To deal with this, we introduce a new variable, 
the number of other funds from the family in a fund’s style (NUMBERINSTYLE), as a control and 
find that our outsourcing effect is not due to this alternative. We have experimented with other 
proxies including an indicator for whether a fund is the only fund in its style 




In sum, we investigate the effects of managerial outsourcing on the incentives and 
performance, using the mutual fund industry as our setting. We first document that many families 
outsource the management of a sizeable fraction of their funds to unaffiliated advisory firms. 
Importantly, we document that funds managed externally significantly under-perform those ran 
internally by 50.4 to 72.0 basis points per year. This result is robust to controlling for various 
observable characteristics about the mutual fund and to unobservable characteristics of fund 
families or advisors. We argue that contractual externalities due to firm boundaries make it more 
difficult to extract performance from an outsourced relationship and force the firm to rely more 
on high-powered incentives.   
However, we do not attempt to distinguish between different alternatives within the 
contractual externalities characteristic of imperfect information environments. Holmstrom (1999) 
considers several different settings within this framework that lead to similar implications. For 
instance, in a single-task setting, a firm may have additional information about an employee other 
than past performance (i.e. how often he shows up to work) and may not need to rely as much on 
past performance. Another interpretation of the findings regarding fund closures is that it is easier 
to fire someone outside of an organization than within. This fits with the theme of “intra-firm 
socialism” in the corporate finance literature on internal capital markets. We cannot rule out all 
forms of unobserved heterogeneity for such implicit incentives findings. However, the 
unobserved heterogeneity alternative becomes less compelling relative to the firm boundaries 
explanation when we consider the performance and incentive results simultaneously. The 
importance of firm boundaries becomes more compelling because both the performance and 
incentive results are consistent with the contractual externalities due to firm boundaries 
alternative. 
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There are a number of avenues for future work. Namely, we have limited information on 
the portfolios of external advisory companies. We only know what these companies manage for 
mutual fund families but not for other institutions such as university endowments. More complete 
data on the portfolios of these companies might allow us to test other auxiliary implications of 
firm boundaries. For instance, we might attempt to measure the extent to which an advisory firm 
faces the multi-tasking trade-offs envisioned by the contractual-externalities-due-to-firm-
boundaries framework. The upshot is that our findings are important not only for the mutual fund 
industry, but they also suggest that this industry is an invaluable laboratory with which to study 
important issues in organization. 
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Table 1: Characteristics of Mutual Fund Families 
 
This table reports the characteristics of mutual fund families in our dataset. For each year, we report the 
total number of distinct mutual fund families in the CRSP Mutual Fund Database, and the average number 
of mutual funds we have identified as either managed in-house or outsourced in each family. We also 
report the fraction of mutual fund families that outsource any of its fund management and the average 
across families of the fractions of funds outsourced within a mutual fund family. We indicate the 
concentration of mutual fund family business with the fraction of total assets under management in a 
family’s modal style and core style. We define the modal style for each family as the investment style for 
























































































1994 345 6.09 0.39 0.23 0.75 
1995 354 6.68 0.37 0.21 0.73 
1996 379 7.32 0.37 0.21 0.73 
1997 418 7.71 0.36 0.20 0.73 
1998 436 8.04 0.41 0.24 0.73 
1999 462 8.52 0.48 0.32 0.74 
2000 510 8.11 0.45 0.28 0.73 
2001 494 8.77 0.47 0.29 0.73 
2002 475 9.07 0.47 0.29 0.73 
2003 473 9.24 0.46 0.29 0.73 
2004 468 9.44 0.48 0.30 0.73 
2005 491 8.16 0.44 0.30 0.73 
2006 465 8.21 0.43 0.30 0.73 
2007 467 8.04 0.42 0.30 0.73 
Average 446 8.10 0.43 0.26 0.73 
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Table 2: Mutual Fund Summary Statistics 
 
This table reports summary statistics for the funds in our sample. Number of Funds is the number of mutual 
funds in our sample each month. TNA is the total net assets under management in millions of dollars. 
LOGTNA is the logarithm of TNA. LOGFAMFUNDS is the natural logarithm of the number of funds in 
the fund family. LOGFAMSIZE is the logarithm of one plus the total assets under management of the other 
funds in the family that the fund belongs to excluding the asset of the fund itself. EXPRATIO is the total 
annual management fees and expenses divided by year-end TNA. TURNOVER is fund turnover, defined as 
the minimum of aggregate purchases and sales of securities divided by the average TNA over the calendar 
year. AGE is the number of years since the organization of the fund. TOTLOAD is the total front-end, 
deferred and rear-end charges as a percentage of new investments. FLOW is the percentage new fund flow 
into the mutual fund over the past year. PRET is the cumulative returns of the fund over the past twelve 
months. TNA, LOGTNA, LOGFAMFUNDS, LOGFAMSIZE, FLOW and PRET are calculated each 
month. Other fund characteristics are reported once a year. All variables are winsorized below at the 1% 
level and winsorized above at the 99% level within each month. The sample is from January 1994 to 
December 2007 and is comprised of all funds. The table reports the time-series averages of monthly cross-
sectional averages and monthly cross-sectional standard deviations (shown in brackets) of fund 

























Number of funds 3079 2271 808 
Total net assets (TNA) 
    ($ million) 
683 771 425 
[1770] [1887] [1353] 
Log of TNA (LOGTNA) 
    (log $ million) 
4.9 5.0 4.4 
[1.9] [1.9] [1.8] 
Log family funds (LOGFAMFUNDS) 
    (log #) 
2.9 3.0 2.9 
[1.7] [1.7] [1.6] 
Log family TNA (LOGFAMSIZE) 
    (log $ million) 
8.1 8.2 7.5 
[2.9] [2.9] [2.6] 
Expense ratio (EXPRATIO) 
    (% per year) 
1.3 1.3 1.3 
[0.6] [0.6] [0.6] 
Fund turnover (TURNOVER) 
    (% per year) 
87.6 89.3 81.4 
[98.6] [98.9] [94.9] 
Fund age (AGE) 
    (years) 
10.3 11.1 7.9 
[11.6] [12.2] [8.9] 
Total sales load (TOTLOAD) 
    (%) 
2.3 2.4 2.1 
[2.5] [2.5] [2.4] 
Fund flow (FLOW) 
    (% per year) 
42.8 41.5 45.9 
[133.7] [131.7] [137.7] 
Past year return (PRET) 
    (% per year) 
1.9 2.0 1.6 
[13.5] [13.6] [12.9] 
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Table 3: Outsourcing and Fund Performance 
 
This table shows the Fama-MacBeth (1973) estimates of monthly fund returns regressed on fund 
characteristics lagged one month. Fund returns are calculated before (gross) deducting fees and expenses. 
These returns are adjusted using the market model, the CAPM, the 4-Factor model, and the 6-Factor model. 
The dependent variable is FUNDRET. OUTSOURCED is an indicator variable that equals one if the fund 
management is outsourced. LOGTNA is the natural logarithm of TNA. LOGFAMFUNDS is the natural 
logarithm of the number of funds in the fund family. LOGFAMSIZE is the natural logarithm of one plus 
the size of the family that the fund belongs to excluding the asset of the fund itself.  EXPRATIO is the total 
annual management fees and expenses divided by TNA. TURNOVER is fund turnover and AGE is the 
number of years since the organization of the mutual fund. TOTLOAD is the total front-end, deferred and 
rear-end charges as a percentage of new investments. FLOW is the percentage new fund flow into the 
mutual fund over the past one year. PRET is the cumulative risk-adjusted fund return over the past twelve 
months. Intercepts have been suppressed. The sample is from January 1994 to December 2007 (168 
months), is comprised of all funds, and consists of 472,469 fund-month observations. Time-series averages 
of monthly regression R-squareds are reported in the last row. The t-statistics are adjusted for serial 
correlation using Newey-West (1987) lags of order three and are shown in parentheses. 
 
 Gross fund returns (monthly %) 
Market-Adj Beta-Adj 4-Factor 6-Factor 
OUTSOURCEDi,t-1 
-0.060 -0.058 -0.046 -0.042 
(4.32) (4.05) (3.31) (3.10) 
LOGTNAi,t-1 
-0.025 -0.019 -0.029 -0.031 
(1.71) (1.39) (2.10) (2.20) 
LOGFAMFUNDSi,t-1 
-0.023 -0.023 -0.023 -0.026 
(1.12) (1.11) (1.16) (1.28) 
LOGFAMSIZEi,t-1 
0.025 0.025 0.026 0.028 
(2.22) (2.19) (2.25) (2.50) 
EXPRATIOi,t-1 
0.043 0.044 0.044 0.052 
(0.49) (0.50) (0.51) (0.60) 
TURNOVERi,t-1 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
(0.76) (0.75) (0.73) (0.72) 
AGEi,t-1 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
(0.02) (0.04) (0.30) (0.21) 
TOTALLOADi,t-1 
-0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 
(1.01) (1.00) (1.05) (1.03) 
FLOWi,t-1 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
(2.68) (2.69) (2.69) (2.71) 
PRETi,t-1 
0.025 0.025 0.025 0.025 
(4.07) (4.07) (4.08) (4.07) 
R-squared 0.175 0.175 0.174 0.173 
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Table 4: Outsourcing and Fund Performance with Fixed Effects 
This table shows the Fama-MacBeth (1973) estimates of monthly fund returns regressed on fund 
characteristics lagged one month. Fund returns are calculated before (gross) deducting fees and expenses. 
These returns are adjusted using the market model, the CAPM, the 4-Factor model, and the 6-Factor model. 
The dependent variable is FUNDRET. OUTSOURCED is an indicator variable that equals one if the fund 
management is outsourced. The other independent variables include LOGTNA, EXPRATIO, 
TURNOVER, AGE, TOTLOAD, FLOW, and PRET. Intercepts have been suppressed. The sample is from 
January 1994 to December 2007 (168 months), is comprised of all funds, and consists of 472,469 fund-
month observations. Time-series averages of monthly regression R-squareds are reported in the last row. 
The t-statistics are adjusted for serial correlation using Newey-West (1987) lags of order three and are 
shown in parentheses.  
 
 Gross fund returns (monthly %) 
Market-Adj Beta-Adj 4-Factor 6-Factor 
OUTSOURCEDi,t-1 
-0.045 -0.043 -0.041 -0.037 
(2.70) (2.79) (2.70) (2.52) 
LOGTNAi,t-1 
-0.034 -0.029 -0.037 -0.040 
(2.33) (2.05) (2.68) (2.81) 
EXPRATIOi,t-1 
0.003 0.004 0.005 0.013 
(0.05) (0.06) (0.07) (0.19) 
TURNOVERi,t-1 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
(0.85) (0.82) (0.80) (0.77) 
AGEi,t-1 
0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 
(0.38) (0.45) (0.65) (0.58) 
TOTALLOADi,t-1 
0.004 0.004 0.003 0.004 
(0.82) (0.82) (0.71) (0.78) 
FLOWi,t-1 
-0.029 -0.031 -0.030 -0.030 
(3.04) (3.06) (3.04) (3.07) 
PRETi,t-1 
0.019 0.020 0.019 0.019 
(3.88) (3.90) (3.88) (3.86) 
Family Fixed Effect? Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Advisor Fixed Effect? Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.464 0.464 0.463 0.462 
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Table 5:  First Stage of 2SRI—The Effect of Family Size at Time of Fund Inception 
on Whether the Fund is Outsourced 
 
This table shows the estimates of the logit regression in the first stage regression the 2SRI estimation of the 
effect of outsourcing on mutual fund performance. The first stage measures the effect of family 
characteristics when the fund was created on whether the mutual fund is outsourced. The dependent 
variable is OUTSOURCED, which is an indicator that equals one if the fund management is outsourced.  
LOGFAMFUNDS AT INCEPTION is the natural logarithm of the number of funds in the fund family 
when the fund was created. LOGFAMSIZE AT INCEPTION is the natural logarithm of one plus the size 
of the family that the fund belongs to when the fund was created, excluding the asset of the fund itself.   
The other independent variables include LOGTNA, LOGFAMFUNDS, LOGFAMSIZE, EXPRATIO 
TURNOVER, AGE, TOTLOAD, FLOW and PRET. A complete set of Month × Year dummies is also 
included in the specification. The sample is from January 1994 to December 2007 (168 months), is 
comprised of all funds, and consists of 472,469 fund-month observations. t-statistics are adjusted by 
allowing for the errors to be correlated across funds within fund families, i.e. the standard errors are 
clustered by fund families. Average marginal effects in percentages (%) are shown in square brackets. 
Unconditional probability of outsourcing is 25.7%. 
 
 OUTSOURCEDi,t-1 
LOGFAMFUNDS AT INCEPTION 0.200 (4.71) 
 [3.577] 






































Pseudo R-squared 0.056 
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Table 6:  Second Stage of 2SRI—The Effect of Outsourcing on Fund Performance 
 
This table shows the second stage of the 2SRI estimation of the effect of outsourcing on mutual fund 
performance. Fund returns are calculated before (gross) deducting fees and expenses. These returns are 
adjusted using the market model, the CAPM, the 4-Factor model, and the 6-Factor model. The dependent 
variable is FUNDRET. OUTSOURCED is an indicator variable that equals one if the fund management is 
outsourced. LOGFAMSIZE AT INCEPTION is the natural logarithm of one plus the size of the family that 
the fund belongs to when the fund was created. The other independent variables include LOGTNA, 
LOGFAMFUNDS, LOGFAMSIZE, EXPRATIO, TURNOVER, AGE, TOTLOAD, FLOW and PRET. 
FIRST STAGE RESIDUAL is the residual from the first stage logit regression of the 2SRI estimation. A 
complete set of Month  Year dummies is also included in the specification. The sample is from January 
1994 to December 2007 (168 months), is comprised of all funds, and consists of 472,469 fund-month 
observations. t-statistics are adjusted by allowing for the errors to be correlated across funds within fund 
families, i.e. the standard errors are clustered by fund families. 
 
 Gross fund returns 
Market-Adj Beta-Adj 4-Factor 6-Factor 
OUTSOURCEDi,t-1 -0.140 -0.127 -0.109 -0.100 
(2.45) (2.29) (2.07) (2.04) 
LOGFAMSIZE AT INCEPTION -0.031 -0.032 -0.032 -0.031 
(2.99) (2.98) (3.05) (2.94) 
LOGTNAi,t-1 -0.040 -0.032 -0.041 -0.043 
(1.95) (1.63) (2.04) (2.10) 
LOGFAMFUNDSi,t-1 0.038 0.040 0.040 0.037 
(2.70) (2.87) (2.93) (2.68) 
LOGFAMSIZEi,t-1 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.015 
(1.62) (1.54) (1.62) (1.90) 
EXPRATIOi,t-1 0.093 0.094 0.094 0.099 
(0.84) (0.85) (0.86) (0.90) 
TURNOVERi,t-1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
(0.23) (0.27) (0.29) (0.30) 
AGEi,t-1 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
(1.97) (1.98) (1.78) (1.78) 
TOTLOADi,t-1 -0.007 -0.007 -0.008 -0.008 
(1.15) (1.16) (1.24) (1.23) 
FLOWi,t-1 -0.041 -0.041 -0.042 -0.041 
(1.88) (1.92) (1.92) (1.91) 
PRETi,t-1 0.020 0.020 0.020 0.020 
(1.45) (1.46) (1.48) (1.46) 
FIRST STAGE RESIDUALi,t-1 0.101 0.090 0.083 0.077 
(1.98) (1.83) (1.75) (1.77) 
R-squared 0.061 0.036 0.036 0.029 
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Table 7: Fund Closures and Past Performance 
 
This table investigates the determinants of mutual fund closures and reports pooled panel logit regression estimates of 
whether a mutual fund is closed on fund characteristics lagged one year. The dependent variable, CLOSED, is an 
indicator function that equals one if the mutual fund is closed during the next year. OUTSOURCED is an indicator 
variable that equals one if the fund management is outsourced. PRET is the market-adjusted fund return over the past 
twelve months. INMODALSTYLE is an indicator that equals one if the fund is in its family’s modal style. The other 
independent variables include LOGTNA, EXPRATIO, LOGFAMFUNDS, LOGFAMSIZE, TURNOVER, AGE, 
TOTLOAD, and FLOW. All regressions include year-effects and investment style effects. The sample is from January 
1994 to December 2007, is comprised of all funds, and consists of 41,633 fund-year observations. t-statistics are 
adjusted by allowing for the errors to be correlated across funds within fund families, i.e. the standard errors are 
clustered by fund families. Average marginal effects in percentages (% per year) are shown in square brackets. The 














































































0.738 0.893 0.798 0.807 0.818 
(5.69) (6.39) (6.05) (6.15) (6.22) 
 [0.913] [1.111] [0.892] [0.890] [0.902] 
PRET i,t-1 
-0.043 -0.025 0.041 0.067 0.075 
(8.76) (3.81) (2.01) (3.07) (3.53) 
 [-0.049] [-0.028] [0.043] [0.068] [0.077] 
PRET i,t-1 
OUTSOURCED i,t-1 
 -0.038 -0.021 -0.023 -0.024 
 (4.49) (3.80) (3.90) (3.97) 
  [-0.070] [-0.115] [-0.124] [-0.124] 
{Ai-Norton t-stat}  {3.25} {3.65} {3.66} {3.58} 
INMODALSTYLE i,t-1 
-0.088 -0.064 -0.060 -0.037 -0.297 
(0.78) (0.56) (0.51) (0.32) (0.92) 
 [-0.100] [-0.072] [-0.062] [-0.038] [-0.298] 
LOGTNA i,t-1 
-0.485 -0.483 -0.468 -0.466 -0.481 
(12.00) (11.89) (11.04) (10.97) (10.48) 
 [-0.555] [-0.548] [-0.486] [-0.476] [-0.491] 
LOGFAMFUNDS i,t-1 
-0.336 -0.333 -0.330 -0.382 -0.363 
(3.11) (3.04) (3.23) (3.66) (3.53) 
 [-0.384] [-0.378] [-0.342] [-0.390] [-0.370] 
LOGFAMSIZE i,t-1 
1.469 1.452 1.537 1.777 1.682 
(3.55) (3.42) (4.11) (4.40) (4.21) 
 [1.680] [1.648] [1.596] [1.816] [1.716] 
EXPRATIO i,t-1 
-4.906 -4.943 -5.125 -5.104 -5.112 
(17.93) (17.76) (17.64) (17.72) (17.72) 
 [-5.612] [-5.611] [-5.320] [-5.216] [-5.216] 
TURNOVER i,t-1 
0.037 0.033 0.031 0.082 0.082 
(3.60) (3.18) (3.15) (7.17) (7.20) 
 [0.042] [0.038] [0.033] [0.084] [0.084] 
AGE i,t-1 
0.026 0.026 0.029 0.029 0.030 
(5.25) (5.17) (5.16) (5.40) (5.51) 
 [0.030] [0.029] [0.030] [0.030] [0.030] 
TOTLOAD i,t-1 
0.306 0.308 0.290 0.283 0.283 
(9.35) (9.34) (8.63) (8.60) (8.62) 
 [0.350] [0.349] [0.300] [0.290] [0.288] 
FLOW i,t-1 
0.001 0.000 0.000 0.005 0.005 
(0.61) (0.61) (0.62) (3.54) (3.38) 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.005] [0.005] 
(continues to next page)
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  -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 
  (2.67) (1.42) (1.41) 
   [-0.003] [-0.002] [-0.002] 
PRET i,t-1 
LOGFAMFUNDS i,t-1 
  -0.001 0.000 0.000 
  (0.14) (0.04) (0.05) 
   [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
PRET i,t-1 
LOGFAMSIZE i,t-1 
  -0.004 -0.021 -0.023 
  (0.39) (1.62) (1.84) 
   [0.005] [-0.021] [-0.023] 
PRET i,t-1 
EXPRATIO i,t-1 
  -0.062 -0.065 -0.065 
  (16.97) (16.50) (16.70) 
   [-0.064] [-0.066] [-0.066] 
PRET i,t-1 
TURNOVER i,t-1 
   0.003 0.003 
   (5.86) (5.84) 
    [0.002] [0.003] 
PRET i,t-1 
AGE i,t-1 
   -0.001 -0.001 
   (3.21) (3.42) 
    [-0.001] [-0.001] 
PRET i,t-1 
TOTLOAD i,t-1 
   0.004 0.004 
   (3.57) (3.57) 
    [0.004] [0.004] 
PRET i,t-1 
FLOW i,t-1 
   -0.001 -0.001 
   (2.86) (2.79) 
    [-0.001] [-0.001] 
PRET i,t-1 
INMODALSTYLEi,t-1 
    -0.021 
    (2.07) 
     [-0.022] 
LOGTNA i,t-1 
INMODALSTYLEi,t-1 
    0.055 
    (0.97) 
     [0.056] 
PRET i,t-1LOGTNA i,t-1 
INMODALSTYLEi,t-1 
    0.002 
    (0.94) 
     [0.002] 
Pseudo R-squared 0.6044 0.6096 0.6438 0.6478 0.6485 
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Table 8:  Fund Closures and Deviations in Fund Risk-Taking from the Norm 
 
This table investigates the determinants of mutual fund closures and reports pooled panel regression estimates of 
whether a mutual fund is closed on fund characteristics lagged one year. The dependent variable, CLOSED, is an 
indicator function that equals one if the mutual fund is closed during that year. OUTSOURCED is an indicator variable 
that equals one if the fund management is outsourced. RISKDEV is either the fund beta-deviation measure or the fund 
idiosyncratic risk measure. The other independent variables include INMODALSTYLE, LOGTNA, LOGFAMFUNDS, 
LOGFAMSIZE, EXPRATIO, TURNOVER, AGE, TOTLOAD, FLOW and PRET. All regressions include year-effects 
and investment style effects. The sample is from January 1994 to December 2007, is comprised of all funds, and 
consists of 41,633 fund-year observations. t-statistics are adjusted by allowing for the errors to be correlated across 
funds within fund families, i.e. the standard errors are clustered by fund families. Average marginal effects in 
percentages (% per year) are shown in square brackets.  The unconditional probability of closure is 2.33% per year. 
 
 CLOSEDi,t 
 Beta Deviation Idio-Risk Deviation 
OUTSOURCEDi,t-1 
1.060 1.174 0.715 0.928 
(5.51) (5.68) (3.62) (3.87) 
 [1.225] [1.358] [0.661] [0.869] 
PRET i,t-1 
-0.042 -0.024 -0.042 -0.026 
(7.54) (3.08) (4.64) (2.41) 
 [-0.043] [-0.025] [-0.036] [-0.022] 
PRET i,t-1  
 OUTSOURCED i,t-1 
 -0.035  -0.038 
 (3.50)  (2.93) 
  [-0.061]  [-0.047] 
{Ai-Norton t-stat}  {2.64}  {2.06} 
RISKDEV i,t-1 
-0.128 -0.094 0.451 0.449 
(2.09) (1.60) (2.22) (1.99) 
 [-0.132] [-0.096] [0.392] [0.388] 
RISKDEV i,t-1 
 OUTSOURCED i,t-1 
0.356 0.293 0.585 0.498 
(4.33) (3.62) (2.61) (2.11) 
 [0.395] [0.333] [0.639] [0.610] 
{Ai-Norton t-stat} {2.90} {2.60} {1.96} {1.83} 
INMODALSTYLE i,t-1 
-0.113 -0.099 -0.112 -0.106 
(0.92) (0.79) (0.85) (0.79) 
 [-0.116] [-0.100] [-0.097] [-0.091] 
LOGTNA i,t-1 
-0.504 -0.501 -0.504 -0.500 
(10.44) (10.43) (8.56) (8.57) 
 [-0.520] [-0.514] [-0.438] [-0.432] 
LOGFAMFUNDS i,t-1 
-0.401 -0.389 -0.460 -0.464 
(3.65) (3.54) (3.41) (3.50) 
 [-0.414] [-0.399] [-0.399] [-0.400] 
LOGFAMSIZE i,t-1 
1.565 1.517 1.815 1.829 
(3.86) (3.75) (3.28) (3.35) 
 [1.616] [1.556] [1.576] [1.580] 
EXPRATIO i,t-1 
-5.579 -5.611 -6.375 -6.408 
(15.86) (15.85) (12.13) (12.14) 
 [-5.760] [-5.753] [-5.538] [-5.538] 
TURNOVER i,t-1 
0.041 0.038 0.000 0.000 
(4.16) (3.75) (5.06) (4.47) 
 [0.042] [0.039] [0.038] [0.035] 
AGE i,t-1 
0.026 0.027 0.022 0.022 
(4.55) (4.62) (3.27) (3.29) 
 [0.027] [0.028] [0.019] [0.019] 
TOTLOAD i,t-1 
0.322 0.322 0.318 0.319 
(8.86) (8.84) (7.85) (7.78) 
 [0.333] [0.330] [0.277] [0.275] 
FLOW i,t-1 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
(0.53) (0.53) (0.53) (0.52) 
 [0.001] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Pseudo R-squared 0.668 0.671 0.728 0.731 
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Table 9:  Outsourcing and Deviations in Fund Risk-Taking from the Norm 
 
This table reports pooled panel regression estimates of annual regressions of how outsourcing affects the 
risk-taking of mutual funds. The dependent variable of the first specification, RISKDEV, is either the beta-
deviation measure or the idiosyncratic risk measure. The independent variables are OUTSOURCED, 
INMODALSTYLE, LOGTNA, LOGFAMFUNDS, LOGFAMSIZE, EXPRATIO, TURNOVER, AGE, 
TOTLOAD, FLOW and PRET. All regressions include year-effects and investment style effects. The 
sample is from 1994 to 2007 and is comprised of all funds. t-statistics are adjusted by allowing for the 






































Pseudo R-squared 0.353 0.405 
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Table 10:  Outsourcing and Hidden Actions 
 
This table shows the Fama-MacBeth (1973) estimates of monthly fund returns regressed on fund 
characteristics lagged one month. Fund returns are calculated before (gross) deducting fees and expenses.   
RGAP is the contemporaneous return gap. IPO is the percentage of assets invested in newly issued stocks 
(less than 6 months old). ICI is the industry concentration index. The dependent variable is either RGAP, 
IPO or ICI. OUTSOURCED is an indicator variable that equals one if the fund management is outsourced. 
LOGTNA is the natural logarithm of TNA. LOGFAMFUNDS is the natural logarithm of the number of 
funds in the fund family.  LOGFAMSIZE is the natural logarithm of one plus the size of the family that the 
fund belongs to excluding the asset of the fund itself. EXPRATIO is the total annual management fees and 
expenses divided by TNA. TURNOVER is fund turnover and AGE is the number of years since the 
organization of the mutual fund. TOTLOAD is the total front-end, deferred and rear-end charges as a 
percentage of new investments. FLOW is the percentage new fund flow into the mutual fund over the past 
one year. PRET is the cumulative (buy-hold) fund return over the past twelve months. Intercepts have been 
suppressed. The sample is from January 1994 to December 2007 (168 months), is comprised of equity 
funds that appear also appear in Thomson Reuters Mutual Fund Holdings database and consists of 125,253 
fund-month observations. Time-series averages of monthly regression R-squareds are reported in the last 
row. The t-statistics are adjusted for serial correlation using Newey-West (1987) lags of order three and are 
shown in parentheses. 
 
 Gross fund returns (monthly %) 
RGAPi,t IPOi,t ICIi,t 
OUTSOURCEDi,t-1 
-0.001 -0.001 -0.002 
(0.11) (3.06) (3.40) 
LOGTNAi,t-1 
-0.020 0.000 0.001 
(3.92) (2.36) (2.00) 
LOGFAMFUNDSi,t-1 
(0.02) -0.002 0.000 
(1.61) (3.34) (0.14) 
LOGFAMSIZEi,t-1 
0.020 0.001 -0.001 
(4.85) (5.71) (5.75) 
EXPRATIOi,t-1 
-0.025 0.004 0.025 
(1.26) (9.52) (20.33) 
TURNOVERi,t-1 
0.000 0.000 0.000 
(2.36) (6.62) (4.16) 
AGEi,t-1 
0.000 0.000 0.000 
(0.02) (5.65) (5.14) 
TOTALLOADi,t-1 
0.002 0.000 -0.002 
(0.66) (1.20) (15.36) 
FLOWi,t-1 
0.000 0.000 0.000 
(0.92) (2.45) (3.03) 
PRETi,t-1 
0.004 0.000 0.000 
(3.20) (3.59) (1.11) 
R-squared 0.051 0.136 0.141 
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Table 11:  Effect of Outsourcing on Performance  
with Additional Hidden Action Controls 
 
This table shows the Fama-MacBeth (1973) estimates of monthly fund returns regressed on fund 
characteristics lagged one month. Fund returns are calculated before (gross) deducting fees and expenses. 
These returns are adjusted using the market model. The dependent variable is FUNDRET. OUTSOURCED 
is an indicator variable that equals one if the fund management is outsourced. LOGTNA is the natural 
logarithm of TNA. LOGFAMFUNDS is the natural logarithm of the number of funds in the fund family.  
LOGFAMSIZE is the natural logarithm of one plus the size of the family that the fund belongs to excluding 
the asset of the fund itself. EXPRATIO is the total annual management fees and expenses divided by TNA. 
TURNOVER is fund turnover, and AGE is the number of years since the organization of the mutual fund. 
TOTLOAD is the total front-end, deferred and rear-end charges as a percentage of new investments. 
FLOW is the percentage new fund flow into the mutual fund over the past one year. PRET is the 
cumulative (buy-hold) fund return over the past twelve months. RGAP is the contemporaneous return gap. 
IPO is the percentage of assets invested in newly issued stocks (less than 6 months old). ICI is the industry 
concentration index. Intercepts have been suppressed. The sample is from January 1994 to December 2007 
(168 months), is comprised of equity funds that appear also appear in Thomson Reuters Mutual Fund 
Holdings database and consists of 125,253 fund-month observations. Time-series averages of monthly 
regression R-squareds are reported in the last row. The t-statistics are adjusted for serial correlation using 
Newey-West (1987) lags of order three and are shown in parentheses. 
 
 Gross fund returns (monthly %) 
OUTSOURCEDi,t-1 
-0.046 -0.041 -0.042 
(3.01) (2.28) (2.22) 
LOGTNAi,t-1 
-0.042 -0.053 -0.048 
(3.83) (3.65) (4.19) 
LOGFAMFUNDSi,t-1 
(0.02) (0.05) (0.03) 
(1.39) (1.07) (1.47) 
LOGFAMSIZEi,t-1 
0.016 0.024 0.025 
(2.53) (1.99) (3.07) 
EXPRATIOi,t-1 
0.110 0.058 0.052 
(1.88) (0.93) (1.16) 
TURNOVERi,t-1 
0.000 0.000 0.000 
(1.24) (0.71) (0.76) 
AGEi,t-1 
0.002 0.002 0.001 
(1.94) (1.69) (1.33) 
TOTALLOADi,t-1 
-0.031 -0.030 -0.027 
(4.11) (4.00) (3.96) 
FLOWi,t-1 
0.000 0.000 0.000 
(0.07) (0.08) (0.80) 
PRETi,t-1 
0.020 0.024 0.023 
(2.63) (3.01) (3.03) 
RGAPi,t 
0.201   
(10.25)   
IPOi,t-1 
 2.059  
 (1.24)  
ICIi,t-1 
  1.625 
  (2.01) 
R-squared 0.236 0.249 0.249 
 
 
 
 
